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1. SUMMARY: On February 28, 1975, in a suit instituted by the State of 
New Mexico, a three-judge district court declared unconstitutional the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1970, 16 U.S. C. §§ 1331-1340, as exceeding 
Congress' power under the Territory and Property Clause of the Constitution, 
Art. IV, sec. 3. SG appeals, contending that the statute is a valid exercise of 






2. FACTS: In January 1974, a New Mexico rancher con,plained to Interior 
Department officials that wild burros were roaming onto his land where they occupie ( 
themselves in various mischievo11s activities. Federal officials were unmoved by th( 
complaint, so the rancher took his grievance to more sympathetic state officials. 
Agents of New Mexico's Livestock Board then 11ndert ook a ronndnp of the intr11ders ai 
a,,ctioned 19 of them off. Upon learning of this disposition, Interior Department 
officials asserted jurisdiction over the burros pursuant to the above statute and 
demanded their return to the public domain. New Mexico responded by filing the 
present suit, seeking a declaration that the statute was 1,nconstiti,tional and req,,esti r. 
an injunction against its enforcement. A three-j11dge co11rt was convened and 
granted New Mex:j.co' s motion for summary jndgment. The dist ct conclnded tha. t the -
legislation exceeded Congress' power. Specifically, the co11rt held that the Territor; 
and Property Cla,,se anthorized only stati,tes designed to protect p11blic lands, \vhere 
the stat11te 11nder scr11tiny went beyond this limited pnrpose to protect animals fo11nd < 
the lands. In addition, the conrt perceived no text11al basis in the stab,te for 11pholdir 
it as an exercise of the commerce power. 
The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and B11rros Act, 16 U.S. C . §§ 1331-1340, R - -
enacted to prevent the continued destruction of wild horses roaming on public lands i! 
the western United States. Section 1 of the Act express es Congress' determination 
that "these horses and burros are fast disappearing from the American scene" and 
mandates that these animals "shall be protected from capture, branding, harassment 
or death; and to accon,plish this they are to be considered in the area where presentl 
found, as an integral part of the natural system of the public lands." The Act confer 








so 11 in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecologica 
balance on the pnblic lands. 11 16 U.S . C. § 1333(a). If horses or burros stray onto 
privately owned land, the Act directs federal officials to have the animals removed, 
but 11 [i]n no event shall such [animals] be destroyed except by the agents of the 
Secretary. 11 16 U.S. C. § 1334. Criminal sanctions are imposed on persons remod. 
or harassing the animals, and for processing the remains of a wild horse or bnrro 
into commercial products. 
3. CONTENTIONS: SG argues that the question is substantial, inasmuch as 
senseless slaughter of the animals for sport or profit has drastically reduced their 
numbers, and since the dist ct 1 s removal of federal protection raises the spectre of 
the animals I extinction. SG contends that the decision on the merits is dead wrong, 
being based on a myopic reading of the Territory and Property Cla11se. Under the 
dist ct 1 s analysis, the SG fears that many salutary federal programs designed to 
protect wildlife are invalid. See, ~• National Wildlife Refuge System Act of 19 66 
16 U.S. C. § 668 et. seq.; Fur Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S. C § 1151 et. seq.; Endange 
ed Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S. C § 1531 et. seq. SG contends that the dist ct 1 s 
res ult eliminates Congress' implicit power to protect wild animals, an authority 
which derives from its plenary jurisdiction over federal territory. 
4. DISCUSSION: The S<i correctly critiques the dist ct 1 s strange result . 
This Court has consistently interpreted the Territory and Property Clause 
expansively. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 330-33 8 
That Clause reasonably extends federal authority to preserve the resources of public 
lands, as well as the land itself. It has been unquestioned, for example, that the 







resources fonnd in public lands. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. at 332. Protection o : 
natural resources in the public domain reasonably extends to protection of wildlife, a 
evidenced by the host of federal measures in this respect cited by the SG and by 
amicus. Even if the dist ct' s spurious interpretation conld wash, one purpose of the 
present statute in granting regulatory anthority to the Secretary was to protect the 
pnblic lands themselves from damage caused by excessive herd popnlation. 16 
U.S. C. § 1333(b), (c). Finally, the Act is aimed in part at preventing the commerci 
exploitation of these animals, 16 U.S. C. §§ 1333(d), 1338(4), a purpose within the 
compass of the Commerce Clause. The dist ct's constitutional analysis is, in short, 
highly suspect. 




Op in app of juris 
st 
As expected a mot w to dismiss or affirm has. en filed by New. Me::dco,. 
Allli<;us briefs have W n been filed by Nevada atte Board of ltgxxE.11· ~--;- , 
Agriculture, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the International Association . 
of Fish and Conservation Conn:nissioners, and the State of Idaho. Obviously 
it would serve little purpose to XlmllD'. detail o ~ unn:narize all of 
their arguments here since this E.ae case is a sure gr~ . But to gxk a 
Agive you an idea of the areas which this case is ely to focus on W, 
/ \the following are some of the major points which are made: 
1. New Mexico argues that this statute exceeeds Congress' 
power under the property clause. It differentiates cases such as 
Ashwander which dealt with riparian water rights associated with the 
purchase of a dam site fxmaxxkexxeaexaixg by the federal government, 
&BDXxkexE.axe and other cases dealing with mineral and water rights 
closely associated with the land.~ It points out that wild and free-roamin 
horses and burros do not issue from the soil and Hal[]! are not"real"propert 
2. New Mexico argues that the COnn:nerce Power is not relevant 
here since Congress did not attempt to justify the statutenere based on 
that power. There were nostatements or findings concerne~ing any ~£feet 
on ~DXENMMUMM Conn:nerce. The three-judge court specifiually 
found that there was no interstate or international migration of these 
horses. 
3. Thus the government's assertion that other federal acts will 
be affected by the decision here is Cwrong~ The state's brief effectively 
distinuishes most ego£ the Acts citea-b-y the gx government based on the 
ground that they contain specific provisions to the effect that nothing 
in the Act will affect the jurisdiction of the state with respect to fish 
and wildlife. See N.M. Brief 15 n. 4; Nevada Brief 11; P.L.F. Brief 6-7. 
The point is also made that the Acts which give full authority to the 
&federal government were premised either on the conn:nerce power l or the 
power over international relations(ie. migratory animals and internatio.!l...al 
agreements). detail 
4. The briefs aixaxil the great harm which these free 
roaming animals cause and that under the 10th Am. the xxx states must have 
some power to deal with them. 
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CS/gg 3-22-76 - -
BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Carl R. Schenker DATE: March 22, 1976 
No. 74-1488 KLEPPE v. NEW MEXICO 
I recorrnnend reversal. 
It is a little difficult to know how properly to 
conceptualize this case, due to the somewhat scattergun arguments 
thrown up by the appellees (hereinafter referred to as the 
"state"). The state appears to argue both (1) that there is 
no federal power and (2) that, even if there is, there is a 
superior authority in the state blocking federal regulation. 
A. The State's Superior Authority 
I turn first to disposing of this argument in order to 
focus attention on issue (1). 
It appears to me that if there is federal authority the 
state has no special interest that prevents the exercise of 
that authority. (This, of course, is usually the case with 
congressional authority.) The state relies both on its 
special power over wildlife and on some vague notion of the 
Tenth Amendment . 








Court establish that, given a source of authority, the 
federal government can legislate over wildlife despite the 
state's interests in wildlife. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S. 416 (more stringent conservation measures in federal law 
authorized under the treaty power); Hunt v. United States, 278 
U.S. 96 (federal killing of animals despite state laws authorized 
under Property Clause). 
(b) The Tenth Amendment argument. This argument 
seems to be that because of the Tenth Amendment the federal 
legislative power over nonceded federal lands is too limited 
to support anything that might be construed as an exercise of 
police power. Or, as the state puts it, the federal government -
is just like an ordinary proprietor of land when the federal 
land has not been ceded by the State. This argument is 
effectively rebutted in the SG's reply brief. Moreover, the 
argument is on its face rebutted by the Property Clause itself. 
It is clear that that clause gives the federal government 
authority that a private owner of land never would have. In 
fact, the Hunt case is an example of federal action taken on 
federal land that a private individual could not have taken. 
Thus, there is no affirmatively protected enclave of 
state authority in this case. The sole question is whether 
there is a lack of power in the federal government to pass the 









B. Congressional Authority 
I will address only the Property Clause issue, because 
\ it seems clear to me that that Clause provides the federal 
I government the authority exercised in this case. (I underscore 
"this" because here the animals were seized while on federal 
property. The state complains about some possible applications 
of the Act where animals, for example, were seized while on 
private property. Different questions would arise as to that kind 
of federal regulation, and the Government might be forced in 
such a case to rely on the Commerce Clause rather than the 
Property Clause to exercise authority.)* 
It appears to me that this is essentially a case of first 
impression. Cases like Ashwander, which deal with natural -----resources, are not dispositive because those resources are 
traditionally part of the land. They therefore come within the 
Property Clause~ grant of power to dispose,which assuredly is 
absolutely plenary: 
The Congress shall have the power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States .... 
The authority exerted here is different. The federal 
government here asserts the power to manage animals pursuant to 
the "needful regulation11 grant . The District Court accordingly 
was correct not to look to the disposition cases. On the other 





hand, I think the District Court took a crabbed view of the 
"needful regulation" power. In essence, the court held 
4. 
that, at least insofar as animals are concerned, the "needful 
regulation" power extended only to protecting the real property 
from damage by animals, the issue in Hunt. 
Nothing in the logic or language of the "needful regulation" 
power suggests such a "protection" limitation. The language is 
certainly expansive enough to cover the assertion of authority 
here: "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting ..• 
Property belonging to the United States." Here the federal 
government has established a regulation concerning trespasses 
on its land that interfere with a use of the land specifically 
approved by Congress - the preservation of the animals. There is 
no logical reason why the federal government cannot assert the 
power to protect this use of its land, just as it could protect 
other uses of the land. In short, I agree with the SG that 
the specific application of the Act in issue in this case is well 
within an authority that should be defined more broadly than the 
District Court defined it. 
Further, the Act app~ars valid as applied here even if a ·~ '---somewhat more crabbed viewAtaken of the Property Clause (along the -
lines pursued by the District Court). Congress noted in the 
Act that the animals were important to the maintenance of a r 
proper ecosystem on the federal lands. That ecosystem includes 







in order to "protect" the fauna on the land, it is "needful" 
to regulate the animals, for example, because of their fertilizing 
the fauna. 
C. Conclusion: 
It seems to me that the foregoing establishes the 
federal authority on the facts of this case. Since the only por~ion 
of the Act really at issue in this declaratory judgment case 
was that dealing with the seizure of animals on federal _land, 
I would reverse. It will then be necessary to remand for 




As noted at p. 3, the animals actually seized in this 
case were on federal land, but the state complains about various 
other possible applications of the Act. Even though this is a 
declaratory judgment, I would duck the other complaints made by the 
state. First, there may not be a "case or controversy" as to other 
possible applications of the Ac ~ Because of this uncertainty, it 
should not be presumed that assertions of power not justified by 
the Property Clause will ever be made under the Act. / Second, 
despite the assertions of the state it is possible that the Act 
in fact applies only to animals on federal land. See the definition 
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CH AMBERS O F 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~ 
ourl of tlrt ~ttittb ,jbdtG 
. gton:. ~- <4. 20'~~, 
June 10, 1976 ~ 
No. 74-1488 - Kleppe v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
-'I 
Mr. Justice Marshall 





June 10, 1976 
No. 74-1488 Kleppe v. New Mexico 
Dear. Thurgood: 
Please Join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
- -
~ttprtmt QJomt ltf f4t 1{ttitth- ~hdt_g 
,i-ag4m¢cn, ~. QJ. 2.llffe'l, 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 10, 1976 
Re: 74-1488 - Kleppe v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 





CHAMB E RS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J. BRENNAN. JR. 
-
.§u:pumt <!Jcu:rt irf tqt 'J.lini±tb .§ta.tts-
';Nf as-Ip:nghnt. ~. cq. 20-giJl.,'.3 
June 10, 1976 
RE: No. 74-1488 Kleppe v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 






~uprtmt (!Jltud cf t4t 'Jllnitth ~tattg 
~aglpngtcn. ~. C!J. 2!lffeJ1.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 10, 1976 





Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
✓ 
- -~u:p-utttt <qomt of ur~ ~ttltt~ ~tattg 
jrrul!pttgfott, 10. <q. 20ffe)1,, 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN June 11, 1976 
V 
Re: No. 74-1488 - Kleppe v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
I~ -
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
- -;§u:punu Ofttltrl irf tltt 'Jltnitt~ ;§tat.es 
jirasqmg~ J. Of. 2llffe'1~ / 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 11, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1488 Kleppe v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
r 
Mr. Justice Marshall 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
.:§tt.punu Qionrl of tfyt ~h .:§bdtg 
Jraglp:nghtn. ~. QI. 2.llffeJ!.~ 
June 14, 1976 
Re: 74-1488 - Kleppe v. New Mexico 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
✓ 
Thurgood I s circulated op1n1on in this case has all votes but mine. 
He reverses the three-judge court by upholding the constitutionality of 
the Act as applied in this case. I think his reasoning is sound and the 
disposition correct. Congress clearly has broad powers pursuant to 
the Property Clause and that power reasonably extends, as he concludes, 
to the protection of wildlife found on the public lands. 
/ 
I find incongruous, however, the proposal to skirt the is sue of 
whether the Act would be constitutional if applied to animals on private 
lands. This fails to come to grips with the hard fact that the district 
court permanently enjoined enforcement of the entire Act. As it now 
stands, the opinion leaves me in doubt as to the constitutionality of § 4 
of the Act. It also seems to invite relitigation because, as the facts of 
this case show, these New Mexico burros roam on both public and 
private land. Accordingly, under my reading, the three-judge court on 
remand is at liberty to leave its injunction intact to the extent that it en-
joins enforcement of § 4. I am of the view that to 11punt 11 entirely on this 
is sue will tend, under the circumstances of this case, to leave a good 
many people in a quandary. I think I will write along the following lines: 
The District Court's judgment invalidated the entire 
Act on grounds that Congress was powerless to enact legis-
lation designed to protect unclaimed horses and burros. Its 
order permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing or 
executing the measure. The result reached by the Court today 
upholds the Act only as applied in this case, where the burros 
were physically seized while roaming on public land. The 
practical effect of the decision therefore seems to me negligible. 
The record shows, and the District Court expressly found, that 
burros in the particular region of New Mexico in question roam 
on private lands as well as on federally owned property. 
- -
- 2 -
Under these circumstances, I find it difficult to under-
stand why the Court avoids the issue of the constitutionality 
of Section 4 of the Act. Section 4, among other things, 
provides that if animals stray onto private land, the owner 
may inform appropriate federal officials who shall arrange 
to have the animals removed. The provision expressly 
prohibits the landowner from destroying or "harassing'' 
stray animals, even though they happen to be on private 
property. 
I find no infirmity in Section 4. Since the animals 
protected by the Act are free-roaming, Congress could 
reasonably assume that, lest the Act in practice become a 
dead letter, federal protection needed to be extended to those 
animals which "stray from public lands .... " Section 4 
implements Congress I assumption, which. as the facts of this 
case show, was an eminently sound one. And if Congress 
enjoys "complete power" over the public lands, as the Court 
today rightly reaffirms, ante, at 12, including the protection 
of wildlife, then that power manifestly extends to animals 
which are "on public lands", § 2 (b), and II stray" therefrom 
onto privately owned land. 
The Court's op1n1on (at p. 18) suggests that the very 
limited holding rests on the fact that it is not "appropriate 
in this declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the 
extent ... " to which Congress has power to protect these 
animals when they roam on private ranch land. 
The Court fails to acknowledge the propensity of burros 
to go wherever the grass is green, and it is inconceivable 
that they will not repeat the trespass. The ranchers are 
entitled to know whether they are limited by federal law or 
only by restraints imposed by the State, and we should 
decide the is sue. 
LlX() 
- -.:§u.punu <lfourl .of tlrt ~b .:§taftg 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
'JlfasJrmghtn, ~. <!f. 21lffe'!~ 
June 16, 1976 
Re: 74-1488 - Kleppe v. New Mexico 
Dear Thurgood: 
1/ 
The enthusiasm that the rancher-water Justices exhibited 
for my scholarly analysis of the grazing problems leads me to 
abandon the idea of separate writing. I assumed ranchers would 
want to be free to shoot trespassing burros but if Byron and 
Bill Rehnquist want to put wild burros on a new form of 11 welfare~' 
I will submit! 
In short, I join you. 
Regards, u t3 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
-
-
-
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